• Overt actions and inaction enabled the horrific success. –

Abraham Michaels, Sept 2026 – The Hamas-led assault of October 7, 2023 killed roughly 1,200 people in Israel and resulted in 251 hostages taken into Gaza. It has been described, almost universally, as an intelligence failure of historic proportions. But the accumulated public record — Israeli investigative journalism, the IDF’s and Shin Bet’s own probes, and soldiers’ testimony — paints a full picture that is effectively impossible to explain as failure alone. Israel possessed the attack plan. It watched the escalating rehearsals. It was warned by multiple states, by its own signals intelligence analysts, by the women monitoring the border cameras, and fears of an attack were documented in the general population along the border. In the months and years before the attack, it degraded its own collection. Then, in the final weeks, it thinned its forces, approved a music festival five kilometers from Gaza over a senior officer’s objection, and, an hour before the breach, stood down the dawn Gaza border patrol.

This article is a condensed summary of www.projectpens.org reporting — this includes an article on October 7th dissenters, and a 40-page research report.

Foreknowledge
The central document is “Jericho Wall.” According to a New York Times investigation, Israeli officials obtained the roughly 40-page Hamas battle plan more than a year before the attack, in 2022[1]. The Shin Bet later confirmed acquiring versions of Hamas invasion plans in both 2018 and 2022[2]. The document “outlined, point by point, exactly the kind of devastating invasion that led to the deaths of about 1,200 people” — an opening rocket barrage, drones to disable border cameras and remote machine guns, gunmen crossing en masse by paraglider, motorcycle and on foot. Hamas “followed the blueprint with shocking precision”1. Confronted on CNN in December 2023, Netanyahu’s own senior adviser Mark Regev conceded the plan was “shockingly close to reality”[3]. Colonel (ret.) Miri Eisen told PBS: “The terror plans of Hamas were known and discounted. That’s the worst part”[4].

Warnings did not stop there. House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Michael McCaul said after a classified briefing that Egypt had warned Israel three days out[5]. Netanyahu called such reports “fake news.” An Egyptian intelligence official told the AP: “We have warned them an explosion of the situation is coming, and very soon, and it would be big. But they underestimated such warnings.” Egypt’s intelligence chief Abbas Kamel reportedly telephoned Netanyahu personally about ten days beforehand to warn that Gazans were likely to attempt “something unusual, a terrible operation”[6].

The tatzpitaniyot — the young women staffing the border observation posts — had reported the rehearsals for months. “We would see them practising every day what the raid would look like,” one told the BBC. “They even had a model tank… they would also show how they would blow it up, and co-ordinate how to take over the forces and kill and kidnap”[7]. They logged daily drone flights, holes dug at the fence, explosives planted[8]. One recalled a running joke on base about who would be on shift the day Hamas attacked[9]. Fifteen of them were killed on October 7 and seven taken hostage.

Inside Unit 8200, a document titled “Detailed End-to-End Raid Training” circulated on September 19, 2023 — eighteen days out. It described Nukhba exercises against IDF command posts, communications hubs and soldiers’ quarters, and estimated a hostage-taking of 200–250 people. The actual figure was 251[10]. A non-commissioned officer emailed superiors days before the attack that “the sword is coming,” urging them to “warn the people”[11]. She and a junior officer had flagged a drill a month earlier rehearsing a multi-point mass invasion, and a senior officer called their warnings “fantasies”[12]. On the night of October 6–7 the IDF identified at least five anomalous indicators — including Israeli SIM cards activating in Hamas hands — held consultations reaching the chief of staff and Shin Bet chief, and still declined to change the ground deployment, reportedly for fear of “burning” human sources in Gaza[13].

Engineered weakness
Against that backdrop, the state showed the opposite of vigilance. By October 7 roughly 70% of relevant ground forces had shifted to the West Bank rather than the Gaza perimeter, with three battalions pulled from the border days before the attack to cover settler Sukkot celebrations[14]. Collection was degraded in parallel: Israel had stopped monitoring Hamas’s handheld radio traffic about a year earlier, judging it “a waste of effort”[15]. Unit 8200’s Gaza-facing operation was not running that morning at all — a two-year-old personnel decision had cut manpower and halted activity overnight and on weekends[16]. Three of seven surveillance aerostats were out of service, including Nahal Oz’s, scheduled for repair the day after the attack[17]. Former observers testified to chronic glitches and being told there was “not enough of a budget”[18].

Then there is Nova, where roughly 360–380 people were killed and dozens taken hostage — close to half the day’s civilian death toll. A month earlier the Negev district police commander had ordered that events not be permitted near the Gaza border[19]. The Gaza Division’s operations officer, Lt. Col. Sahar Fogel, opposed extending the rave into October 7 as a “needless security risk,” was backed by other officers, and was instructed by IDF headquarters to approve it anyway[20]. Col. Haim Cohen, who signed the authorization, drove south overnight amid escalating alerts, viewed the crowd of more than 4,000 at about 5:30 a.m., and neither dispersed it nor mentioned it in later situation briefings[21]. Most units in the sector did not know the festival existed. When organizers called for help after 7 a.m. they were told to fend for themselves; the first serious IDF force reached the site at 3 p.m.[22].

Everything fails, or ‘fails’?
During the attack the failures were effectively total and simultaneous. Military communications collapsed while civilian cellphones worked normally15. The Air Force commander reportedly did not learn of the Nova massacre for nearly ten hours[23], even as attendees livestreamed, called emergency services, and Hamas broadcast its own footage. Only two fighter jets and two helicopters were immediately available. One helicopter crew that spotted Hamas vehicles declined to engage over friendly-fire uncertainty15,[24]. Soldiers were forced to improvise transport in private cars and commandeered buses. At Kibbutz Be’eri the IDF’s own inquiry found forces that reached the perimeter failed to enter and fight amid “scattered or conflicting orders”[25]. And at roughly 5:20–5:30 a.m., about an hour before the breach, the standing dawn patrol along the Gaza fence was called off — confirmed by three Golani soldiers to the BBC18, by a platoon sergeant at the Paga outpost to Haaretz[26], and in July 2025 testimony with Knesset members by Sgt. Shalom Sheetrit[27]. Separately, the IDF invoked the officially defunct Hannibal Directive during the day’s fighting, and a police investigation found helicopter fire “apparently harmed” civilians at the festival[28],[29]. Lt. Col. Nof Erez has stated that it amounted to a “mass Hannibal”[30].

The dissenters
These anomalies produced dissent almost immediately. Efrat Fenigson, a former IDF intelligence soldier who served on the Gaza border, wrote on the evening of October 7 itself: “A cat moving alongside the fence is triggering all forces. So this? …Something is very wrong here”[31]. Col. Douglas Macgregor, who toured Israel’s Southern Command headquarters in 2020, is categorical: “Within two weeks it became pretty damn obvious to me that this was not an accident. This was deliberate. They let it happen”[32]. Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn says he has “heard from some of the soldiers that were told to stand down and the exact hours… something broke down and it wasn’t because of mistakes”[33]. Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, Colin Powell’s former chief of staff, wrote privately that the record “suggests complicity, a desire to ‘let things happen,’ and then capitalize on them”[34]. Ralph Nader wants the story “probed until Netanyahu’s responsibility for enabling Hamas is exposed”[35]. Princeton’s Richard Falk, the UN Special Rapporteur on Palestinian territories for years, calls it “highly improbable” that surveillance missed rehearsals conducted almost openly[36].

Where it stands now
Three recent developments matter. First, on September 8, 2026, Haaretz reported — from the forthcoming book Hostages: 843 Days of Abandonment by Shlomi Eldar and Ruti Yuval — that UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed telephoned Netanyahu roughly ten days before the attack and warned, in a 45-minute call, that Yahya Sinwar was planning a major operation, conveyed via a Palestinian mediator as a coming “earthquake.” Netanyahu reportedly reacted calmly. His office called the account an “absolute lie”[37],[38]. Eldar told CNN, “I have the document, I have records”[39]. Opposition leaders Eisenkot, Bennett, Lieberman and Golan jointly demanded to know what Netanyahu knew and why he did not alert the security establishment38.

Second, there is still no state commission of inquiry, nearly three years on. The High Court repeatedly extended the government’s deadline rather than compel one, and in August 2026 Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara — while calling a state commission “unmistakably the appropriate” mechanism and the delay “highly unusual” — proposed leaving it to whatever government emerges from the October 27 election[40],[41]. Netanyahu has pushed instead for a politically appointed probe.

Third, the security establishment has rejected the strongest version of the thesis: in February 2026 Shin Bet chief David Zini said there was “no ‘treason’ or ‘collaboration’,” only “a severe professional failure”[42]. That has not settled the matter publicly. A Maariv poll published September 4, 2026 found 40% of Israelis believe there was a “betrayal from within,” against 44% who do not; among coalition voters it reaches 61%[43]. An earlier Channel 12 survey found 46% of first-time voters believed the same41. Notably, the suspicion now runs strongest on the Israeli right, where it is aimed at the security services rather than at Netanyahu — a mirror image of the dissenters’ argument.

Full exposure represents a historic opportunity — for everyone
Our analysis suggests complicity and involvement are actually systemic, involving entrenched power within the political, intelligence, and military verticals. Compartmentalized and suppressed, but waiting to be exposed. The tragedy of the Zionist project in Palestine has almost always been dictated by radical and violent elements. These elements have continuously won the day through overt violence, deception, and lies. Over decades, the Israeli populace has been conditioned to accept a mixture of overt lies, a false reading of history, and self-delusion. This increasingly creates a tenuous grip on reality itself and an inability to see what is possible. What was always possible.

A mixture of fear, hatred, and indifference towards the indigenous Palestinians has been nurtured since the early 1900s and has now reached a crescendo. Zionist elites, Revisionist Zionists, and now Likud and associated ideologues have always been seeking the maximum land, with the minimum of Palestinians. This has victimized and dispossessed indigenous Palestinians in truly horrific dimensions, but Israelis have always been a necessary sacrifice, as well.

If Israelis can uncover this crime in full, it stands to trigger a revolutionary domino effect. If we can somehow find a “period of calm,” they can pull on a thread of events and lies spanning decades. Instead of two peoples in Palestine, separated like oil and water through fomented and orchestrated violence, paths towards sharing the land can eventually, finally, be explored.

References
[1] The New York Times, “Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan Over a Year Ago,” Nov. 30, 2023 — https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel-hamas-attack-intelligence.html

[2] NPR, “What went wrong? Israel’s spy agency lists failures in preventing Oct. 7 attack,” Mar. 5, 2025 — https://www.npr.org/2025/03/05/nx-s1-5318591/israel-shin-bet-security-failure-october-7-attack

[3] CNN, Mark Regev interview on the “Jericho Wall” document, Dec. 1, 2023 — https://www.cnn.com/videos/world/2023/12/02/mark-regev-israel-october-5-intelligence-sot-ebof-vpx.cnn

[4] PBS, Amanpour and Company, Col. Miri Eisen interview, Oct. 27, 2023 — https://www.pbs.org/video/october-27-2023-hp3fda/

[5] The Guardian, “Egypt warned Israel of Hamas attack days earlier, senior US politician says,” Oct. 12, 2023 — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/oct/12/israel-hamas-war-egypt-warned-foreign-affairs-gaza

[6] The Times of Israel, “Egypt intelligence official says Israel ignored repeated warnings of ‘something big’,” Oct. 9, 2023 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/egypt-intelligence-official-says-israel-ignored-repeated-warnings-of-something-big/

[7] BBC, “They were Israel’s ‘eyes on the border’ – but their Hamas warnings were ignored,” Jan. 14, 2024 — https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-67958260

[8] Politico, “Our warnings on Hamas were ignored, Israel’s women border troops say,” Nov. 21, 2023 — https://www.politico.eu/article/israel-border-troops-women-hamas-warnings-war-october-7-benjamin-netanyahu/

[9] ABC News, “IDF soldiers say repeated warnings of Hamas activity prior to Oct. 7 attacks were ignored,” June 28, 2024 — https://abcnews.go.com/International/idf-soldiers-repeated-warnings-hamas-activity-prior-oct/story?id=111312207

[10] Haaretz, “Report: New Evidence Reveals IDF Had Detailed Prior Knowledge of Hamas Plan to Raid Israel,” June 18, 2024 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-06-18/ty-article/report-new-evidence-reveals-idf-had-detailed-prior-knowledge-of-hamas-plan-to-raid-israel/00000190-2afb-d2de-af9e-6ffbdf700000

[11] The Times of Israel, “‘The sword is coming’: Biblical IDF email warned of Hamas plans days before Oct. 7,” July 5, 2024 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/the-sword-is-coming-idf-email-warned-of-hamas-plans-days-before-oct-7-report/

[12] The Times of Israel, “Reports: Senior IDF officer dismissed pre-Oct. 7 intel on Hamas invasion as ‘fantasy’,” Nov. 24, 2023 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/reports-senior-idf-officer-dismissed-pre-oct-7-intel-on-hamas-invasion-as-fantasy/

[13] The Times of Israel, “IDF identified but ignored 5 warning signs of Hamas attack on eve of Oct. 7, its probe shows,” Feb. 27, 2025 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-identified-but-ignored-5-warning-signs-of-hamas-attack-on-eve-of-oct-7-its-probe-shows/

[14] New Lines Magazine, “How Changes in the Israeli Military Led to the Failure of October 7,” May 20, 2024 — https://newlinesmag.com/argument/how-changes-in-the-israeli-military-led-to-the-failure-of-october-7/

[15] Business Insider, “Israel stopped monitoring Hamas’ radio comms a year ago because they thought it was a waste of time: New York Times,” Oct. 30, 2023 — https://www.businessinsider.com/israel-stopped-monitoring-hamas-radio-comms-last-year-nyt-report-2023-10 (source reporting: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/29/world/middleeast/israel-intelligence-hamas-attack.html)

[16] The Times of Israel, “Top Israeli intel unit wasn’t operational on October 7 due to personnel decision,” Nov. 28, 2023 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/top-israeli-intel-unit-wasnt-operational-on-october-7-due-to-personnel-decision/

[17] BBC, “Six hours at hands of Hamas – new accounts reveal how Israeli base fell on 7 October,” Oct. 4, 2024 — https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cg7825rk8j9o

[18] The Times of Israel, “IDF surveillance troops testify to glitches, neglect, no warfare training before Oct. 7,” Sept. 17, 2024 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-surveillance-troops-testify-to-glitches-neglect-no-warfare-training-before-oct-7/

[19] Haaretz, “Month Before Oct. 7 Nova Massacre, Israeli Police Banned Events Near Gaza Border,” Sept. 17, 2025 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-09-17/ty-article/.premium/month-before-oct-7-nova-massacre-israeli-police-banned-events-near-gaza-border/00000199-57ce-d0dc-afdb-d7ff89750000

[20] Haaretz, “‘Needless Security Risk’: Israeli Army Approved Nova Festival Despite Senior Officer’s Alarm,” Dec. 25, 2023 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-25/ty-article/.premium/idf-allowed-rave-later-attacked-by-hamas-despite-key-officers-concern/0000018c-9d78-ddc3-a1bf-bf7edca30000

[21] Haaretz, “Top IDF Commander Opted Not to Boost Security After Visiting Nova One Hour Before October 7 Hamas Massacre,” Sept. 2, 2025 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2025-09-02/ty-article/.premium/top-idf-commander-ignored-risks-after-visiting-nova-mere-hour-before-oct-7-hamas-massacre/00000199-09f0-d21e-a9db-1bfbe01b0000

[22] Haaretz, “‘This Massacre Should Have Been Prevented’: Despite Israeli Intelligence Warnings About a Hamas Attack, the Army Didn’t Evacuate the Nova Festival,” Dec. 5, 2023 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-05/ty-article/.premium/despite-intel-warnings-about-a-hamas-attack-the-army-didnt-evacuate-the-nova-festival/0000018c-3993-dc03-a9ec-3dfb2cda0000

[23] Ynet, “Air Force commander unaware of Nova massacre until hours into attack, report says,” Nov. 9, 2024 — https://www.ynetnews.com/article/hjxtycjp0

[24] World Israel News, “IDF helicopter saw Hamas invasion on Oct. 7 but didn’t intervene – report,” Sept. 14, 2025 — https://worldisraelnews.com/idf-helicopter-saw-hamas-invasion-on-oct-7-but-didnt-intervene-report/

[25] NBC News, “Israeli military abandoned kibbutz for hours during Hamas’ attack Oct. 7, IDF inquiry finds,” July 12, 2024 — https://www.nbcnews.com/news/world/israeli-military-kibbutz-internal-inquiry-rcna161497

[26] Haaretz, “Shortly Before Hamas Attacked, a Warning Arrived. What Happened at This Crucial Outpost?,” Dec. 27, 2023 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2023-12-27/ty-article-magazine/.premium/shortly-before-the-hamas-attack-this-warning-arrived-what-happened-at-the-paga-outpost/0000018c-a631-dc33-a78c-bfb9f5360000

[27] Shalom Sheetrit, Knesset committee testimony, July 17, 2025 (video) — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4tMQo4Z0OI ; see also Efrat Fenigson, “Oct 7 Stand Down Order — Another Proof,” July 31, 2025 — https://www.efrat.blog/p/oct-7-stand-down-order-another-proof

[28] Haaretz, “IDF Ordered Hannibal Directive on October 7 to Prevent Hamas Taking Soldiers Captive,” July 7, 2024 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-07/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-ordered-hannibal-directive-on-october-7-to-prevent-hamas-taking-soldiers-captive/00000190-89a2-d776-a3b1-fdbe45520000

[29] The Times of Israel, “IDF officers invoked defunct ‘Hannibal Protocol’ during Oct. 7 fighting, report,” July 4, 2024 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/idf-officers-invoked-defunct-hannibal-protocol-during-oct-7-fighting-report/

[30] Haaretz, “IDF Ordered Hannibal Directive on October 7 to Prevent Hamas Taking Soldiers Captive,” July 7. 2024 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-07/ty-article-magazine/.premium/idf-ordered-hannibal-directive-on-october-7-to-prevent-hamas-taking-soldiers-captive/00000190-89a2-d776-a3b1-fdbe45520000

[31] Efrat Fenigson, “Israel-Hamas War – An Update,” Oct. 7, 2023 — https://www.efrat.blog/p/israel-hamas-war-an-update

[32] Col. Douglas Macgregor on Part of the Problem with Dave Smith, Oct. 2, 2025 — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YOOMa5wFlY0 ; also Judging Freedom, Jan. 23, 2025 — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z8VAEiuv7Cw

[33] Lt. Gen. Michael Flynn on Bannon’s War Room, Aug. 6, 2025 — https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SCBOdczNCkw

[34] Col. Lawrence Wilkerson, private correspondence to PROJECTPENS, Nov. 15, 2025, quoted in “The October 7 dissenters” — https://projectpens.substack.com/p/the-dissenters

[35] Ralph Nader, Common Dreams, May 31, 2025 — https://www.commondreams.org/opinion/us-media-bias-netanyahu

[36] Richard Falk, interviewed by the Schiller Institute, July 31, 2025 — https://youtu.be/gwstoAtGW1g

[37] Haaretz, “Netanyahu Got an Explicit Warning Before Oct. 7. He Didn’t Brief Security Chiefs,” Sept. 8, 2026 — https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/israel-security/2026-09-08/ty-article-magazine/.highlight/netanyahu-got-an-explicit-warning-before-oct-7-he-didnt-brief-security-chiefs/000001a0-7a3b-d7d5-a9fc-7eff3d0f0000

[38] The Guardian, “Netanyahu was warned of 7 October Hamas attacks, book claims,” Sept. 8, 2026 — https://www.theguardian.com/world/2026/sep/08/netanyahu-warned-7-october-hamas-book-haaretz

[39] CNN, “Netanyahu faces backlash over report he was warned of Hamas attack days before October 7,” Sept. 8, 2026 — https://www.cnn.com/2026/09/08/middleeast/netanyahu-report-warning-uae-hamas-attack-intl

[40] The Times of Israel, “Attorney general: Overdue state inquiry into Oct. 7 should now wait for next government,” Aug. 19, 2026 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/attorney-general-overdue-state-inquiry-into-oct-7-should-now-wait-for-next-government/

[41] The Christian Science Monitor, “Their nation at war, Israelis still demand to know: How could Oct. 7 happen?,” Apr. 28, 2026 — https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2026/0428/israel-netanyahu-gaza-war-official-inquiry

[42] The Times of Israel, “‘There was no treason’: Shin Bet chief rejects conspiracy theories of Israeli collaborators on October 7,” Feb. 26, 2026 — https://www.timesofisrael.com/shin-bet-chief-rejects-conspiracy-theories-of-israeli-collaborators-on-october-7/

[43] The Jerusalem Post, “‘October 7 treason?’ 40% of Israelis believe there was ‘betrayal from within’ during massacre,” Sept. 4, 2026 — https://www.jpost.com/israel-election-2026/article-907575